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WEIGHING DEMOCRACY ANDJUDICIAL LEGITIMACY IN
JUDICIAL SELECTION
KENNETH S. KLEIN*
ABSTRACT

For over two centuries Americans have debated whether judges should
be elected or appointed. While the explicitly-framed tension has been about
the relative importance of judicial independence and judicial
accountabilityin a democracy, the underlying issue has been about which
structure betterpromotes the legitimacy of the judiciary. An institution has
legitimacy when it enjoys diffuse support even for controversial decisions.
Judicial legitimacy is in inherent tension with a judiciary in a democracy,
since democracy implicitly assumes political elements to selection of all
leaders (including judges), while judicial legitimacy is undermined by
politics. The contemporary work on the relationship between judicial
selection methods and legitimacy does not support a clear preference for
judicialelection versus judicialappointment. This Article proposes that in
order to promotejudicial legitimacy in a democracy, considerationshould
be given to a civil service-like, nonpartisan, objective merit screening of
judicial aspirants-whetherthe aspirant ultimately is selected through
election or appointment.
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INTRODUCTION

Yogi Berra is attributed with saying, "You can observe a lot by
just watching."' This Article seeks to "re-watch" the centuries old
American debate-should judges be elected or appointed-and
"observe" that it largely may have been asking the wrong question.
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged,
The desirability of judicial elections is a question that has
sparked disagreement for more than 200 years. Hamilton
believed that appointing judges to positions with life tenure
constituted "the best expedient which can be devised in any
government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws." Jefferson thought that making
judges "dependent on none but themselves" ran counter to the
2
principle of "a government founded on the public will."

The debate over how judges are selected is a robust one and
continues today in decisional law and academic literature. The
focus is primarily on elections. What is the impact, both on voters
and on judicial behavior, of money? Of campaigning based on
issues the judge might rule upon? Of aggressive advertising? Of
partisan affiliation? Are judicial elections different from other
elections? Should they be?
The underlying narrative is one about what contemporary
theorists call "legitimacy." Essential to a functioning democracy is
a judicial function seen as legitimate-meaning it is trusted even
when it rules in controversial or unpopular ways.
The thesis of this Article is that engaging in the debate over how
judges should be selected is more important now than ever, but
that what has emerged so far is a chaotic and contradictory data
set. The solution to this apparent Gordian knot is to shift focus to
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. Louis and Hermione Brown
Professorship in Preventative Law. Thank you to my colleagues, who graciously endured
my presentation of a draft of this paper and then improved it with their comments. Thank
you to my student research assistant, David Bock. Thank you to Professor Lisa Black, who
is both my intellectual and actual proofreader. Particular thanks go to my now adult child,
Grace HB Klein, whose insights as a Stanford student during then-fellow student Brock
Turner's actions, arrest, and trial helped give direction to this Article. Thank you to
Professor Mark Wojcik, without whom I would have had no understanding of the
international human rights implications of this work. Thank you to the participants of the
Osher Lecture Series at the UCSD Extension School, whose questions made this paper
better. And thank you to the student editors of this journal, who exhibited courage,
diligence, and intellect in bringing this paper to publication.
1. Nate Scott, The 50 Greatest Yogi Berra Quotes, USA TODAY (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2015/09/the-50-greatest-yogi-berra-quotes.
2. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672-73 (2015) (citations omitted).
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an earlier process juncture-being precise, objective, apolitical,
and unforgiving in screening who is qualified to be considered to
be ajudge.
The stakes today are higher than they have ever been. Over two
centuries ago, Hamilton and Jefferson had a conversation about
balancing the values of democracy and justice. What is the more
important system value-an accountable judge or an independent
judge? The conundrum goes to the essence of what a judiciary
should be in a democracy. Can we trust ajudge who has to answer
to the people? Can we trust a judge who does not have to answer
to the people?' And contemporaneously with addressing that
philosophical riddle, the Founders embedded in the Constitution
a thrice-memorialized democratic check on potentially autocratic
judges-the jury.4 But today the jury has all but disappeared:

J] uries hear . .. around one to four percent of criminal cases in
federal and state courts and hear less than one percent of civil
cases in federal and state courts.... Even when juries hear cases,
judges often second-guess them, taking cases from them using
procedures that did not exist at the time of the founding.'
So today the manner ofjudicial selection often is the only democratic
check on potentially autocratic power in the judicial branch.
Little clarity has come from the academic and judicial focus on
whether-and if so, how-judges should be elected. Much study
has been given to the impact on the perceived legitimacy of the
courts from electing judges. Much study has looked at the
increased politicization of the judicial appointment process. And
read collectively, the body of work approaches being oxymoronic.
That is not to say that the work is flawed. Rather, correctlystructured study of whether legitimacy is enhanced by electing or
appointing judges should not come to a clear answer if it turns out
that picking one manner ofjudicial selection or the other does not
materially matter to balancing democracy, justice, and legitimacy.
There is a recent anecdotal case study concretely illustrating
precisely that-that the manner of judicial selection in fact may

3. See Mary L. Volcansek, AppointingJudges the European Way, 34 FORDHAM URBAN L.J.
363, 364-67 (2006) (arguing that the predominant view in the United States-that
independence and accountability can be simultaneously served-is itself a flaw, as
exemplified by Europe where a clear choice for independence has been made).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2; U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
5. Suja A. Thomas, The Missing Branch of the Jury, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1261, 1262-63
(2016).
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not matter to the ultimate legitimacy of the judiciary. Consider the
firestorm of reaction to California Judge Aaron Persky after the
sentencing hearing of convicted rapist and former Stanford
swimmer Brock Turner.
Aaron Persky was a California superior court judge. In
California, all trial judges nominally are elected for six-year terms.'
But new judges rarely gain their seats by election.7 Typically the
Governor appoints ajudge to a position that has vacated midterm,
and the judge is then on the ballot as the incumbent in the next
general election. 8 California judicial elections are nonpartisan. 9
Incumbentjudges are rarely opposed, and even when opposed are
rarely defeated.10
Judicial appointments have a significant apolitical, meritselection component. Persons interested in becoming a judge
apply to the Governor's appointments office." Applications go
through extensive review by the State Bar of California's Judicial
Nomination Evaluation Commission.1 2 The Governor nominates
a person who survives that evaluation.1 3 And then the nominee is
subject to legislative advice and consent. 4
The California approach is an intricate one intended to
produce a professional, qualified-in other words, a neutral and
process.
a democratic
through
independent-judiciary
seat is
judicial
Sometimes judges are opposed; sometimes a
"open," with no incumbent on the ballot; and, sometimes an
incumbent does lose. But even that process does not always lead
to a perception ofjudicial legitimacy.
Brock Turner, a former freshman swimmer at Stanford, was
convicted of three counts of sexual assault.' 5 Turner digitally
6. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.
7. judicial Selection in the

States:

California, NAT'L

CTR.

FOR

ST.

Crs.,

http://judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/index.cfm?state=CA.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. judicial Appointment Applications, OFFICE OF Gov. EDMUND

G. BROWN JR.,
https://www.gov.ca.gov/sjudicialappointments.php.
CAL.,
OF
BAR
12. Commission on judicial Nominees Evaluation, STATE
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Committees-Commissions/JudicialNominees-Evaluation; Title 7: Miscellaneous Provisions, STATE BAR OF CAL. (2007),
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/rules/RulesTitle7_Divl-JNE.pdf.
13. Title 7: Miscellaneous Provisions, supranote 12, at 1.
14. REECE TREVOR ET AL., STANFORD L. SCH. L. AND POL'Y LAB, JUDICIAL
SELECTION IN CALIFORNIA 15-17 (2017), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-

content/uploads/2017/05/JudicialSelection-in

CaliforniaReport.pdf.

15. Janette Gagnon & Emanuella Grinberg, Mad About Brock Turner's Sentence? It's Not
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penetrated an unconscious woman behind a trash dumpster.16 On
June 2, 2016, Judge Persky, himself a former student athlete at
Stanford University,17 adjudicated the sentencing hearing of
Brock Turner. Judge Persky-weighing among other evidence a
victim impact statement that had "gone viral" as a moving
description of the consequences of rape," countered by a defense
statement by Turner's father describing the rape conviction as "a
steep price to pay for 20 minutes of action out of his 20 plus years
of life"' 9-sentenced Turner to six months in jail, citing the
"extraordinary circumstances" of Turner's youth and lack of
criminal record.20
Public response could be charitably described as an explosion. A
petition drive began to impeach Judge Persky.2 1 The California
legislature passed a law to prohibit similarly "light" sentences in the
future.2 2 Judge Persky was "voluntarily" reassigned to only civil
cases.23 A formal recall campaign began.24 The saga seemed to come
to a close when, on December 19, 2016, the California Commission
onJudicial Performance concluded there was no evidence thatJudge
Persky displayed bias or was otherwise guilty ofjudicial misconduct
warranting discipline.25 But, onJanuary 23, 2018, the County of Santa
Uncommon, CNN (Sept. 4, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/02/us/brock-turnercollege-athletes-sentence/index.html.
16. Id.
17.

FullBiographyforAaronPersky, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CAL: SMARTVOTER (Feb.

26, 2002), http://www.smartvoter.org/2002/03/05/ca/scl/vote/perskya/bio.htrml.
18. Lindsey Bever, 'You Took Away My Worth':A Sexual Assault Victims PowerfulMessage to Her
Stanford Attacker, WASH. POST (June 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonposLcom/news/earlylead/wp/2016/06/04/you-took-away-my-worth-a-rape-victim-delvers-powerful-message-tofonner-stanford-swimmer/.
19. Tom Cleary,,READ: Full Letter to the Judge by Dan Turner, Brock's Father, HEAVY
(Updated Aug. 29, 2016, 5:40 PM), http://heavy.com/news/2016/06/brock-tumerfather-dad-dan-turner-full-letter-statement-stanford-rapist/.
20. Marina Koren, Why the StanfordJudge Gave Brock Turner Six Months, ATLANTIC (June
17,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/stanford-rape-casejudge/487415/.
21.- Maria Ruiz,.Remove Judge Aaron Persky from the Benchfor Decision in Brock TurnerRape
Case, cHANGE.ORG,
https://www.change.org/p/california-state-house-impeach-judgeaaron-persky.
22. Jazmine Ulloa, Spurred by Brock Turner Case, Gov. Jery Brown Signs Laws to Toughen
Laws Against Rape, L.A. TIMEs, (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-polsac-california-sex-crimes-stanford-cosby-bills-20160930-snap-htmlstory.htnl.
23. Emanuella Grinberg & Dan Simon, Brock TurnerJudge to No Longer Hear Criminal
Cases, CNN (Aug. 26, 2016), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/25/us/brock-turneraaron-perskyjudge-reassigned/.
24. Aaron Persky Recall, Santa Clara County, California (2018), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Aaron-Persky-recall,_SantaClaraCounty,_California_(2018).
25. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
CLOSES INVESTIGATION OF JUDGE AARON PERSKY (Dec. 19, 2016), https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-

content/uploads/sites/40/2016/08/PerskyExplanatoryStatement_12-19-16.pdf.
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Clara Registrar of Voters reported that a Judge Aaron Persky recall
26
petition qualified for the June 5, 2018, statewide primary ballot. In
that election, voters did in fact recall Judge Persky (the first
California judge to be successfully recalled in eighty-six years).27
The underlying, unspoken narrative of Judge Persky's public
excoriation seemed to be one of a community frustrated that it
could not easily, immediately, and effectively punishJudge Persky.
That is a frustration with some irony. Judge Persky stood for
reelection just six days after handing down the Brock Turner
sentence.28 But the ballot had long been closed, andJudge Persky
was unopposed." That left the public with less obvious options to
respond to what was generally perceived as a failure of justice.
Judge Persky administered justice as he saw it, but in a deeply
unpopular way. Ultimately, he lost his job.3 o He suffered
consequences which could influence, by way of example, the judicial
decision-making of otherjudges.3 ' Aspects of this saga reflected both
judicial independence and judicial accountability. So, is this an
2
example of a broken system or one behaving as it should?
No matter where one stands on the election-or-appointment
divide, or the independence-or-accountability divide, the Judge
Persky saga is frustrating. How could he have thought this was
acceptable? Who are we to second-guess a conclusion having not

26. Maggie Astor, California Voters Remove judge Aaron Pershy, Who Gave a 6-Month
Sentence

for

Sexual

Assault,

N.Y.

TIMES

(June

6,

2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us/politics/Judge-persky-brock-turnerrecall.html.

27. Id.
28. John Bacon,Judge Under Firein Stanford Rape Case Gets New Term, USA TODAY, (June
7, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/06/07/Judge-stanford3 204
/.
sex-assault-case-draws-outrage/8554
Judge Run Unopposed for Re-election, SAN DIEGO
California
29. Associated Press, Northern
UNION-TRIBUNE, (June 8, 2016), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-northem-

california-judge-run-unopposed-for-re-2016junO8-story.html.
30. Astor, supra note 26.
31. See MarkJoseph Stern, This Is How Mass IncarcerationHappens, SLATE (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/the-dangerous-misguided-campaign-to-recallthejudge-who-sentenced-brock-turner.html?via=recircrecent (arguing that the recall of
Judge Persky may have been well-intentioned, but could pressure judges to play it safe by
sentencing others harshly).
32. One must be careful to not overinterpret the example. For instance, perhaps the
"dilemma" ofJudge Persky reflects biases turning on gender and privilege. Consider the
contrast of the reaction to the Brock Turner sentencing with The Times newspaper in
London reporting positively on the likelihood that a female Oxford student aspiring to be
a heart surgeon might be spared anyjail time for stabbing her boyfriend in the leg. Frances
Gibb &Jonathan Ames, 'Extraordinary'Student Could Be SparedjailforStabbing Boyfriend, THE
TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/extraordinary-student-couldbe-spared-jail-for-stabbing-boyfriend-jmvb372vm.
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seen the full set of evidence and witnesses? If he was still a fully
qualified judge, then why did he have to abandon presiding over
criminal trials? What the story of Judge Persky seems to illustrate
is that the way one thinks about judges, elections, appointments,
and removal neither creates consensus nor even progress toward
a satisfactory solution.
ProfessorJames L. Gibson writes, "When people know that they
have the power to turn out judges who perform poorly, they are
more willing to accept the decisions of those judges." 3 But as the
Brock Turner saga exposes, people often do not actually have the
power to turn out judges who perform poorly, at least not easily,
which makes people angry.
Further, if the end goal is legitimacy, then the "willingness"
Gibson describes is emblematic of illegitimacy, not of legitimacy.
The central tenet of "Legitimacy Theory" is that a legitimate
institution enjoys support even when society disagrees with the
institution's specific acts.3 4

What then is the lesson of the provocative example of the Brock
Turner trial and the public reaction to its presiding judge, Aaron
Persky? One explanation is that a methodology of judicial
selection-even an intricate, thoughtful, hybrid method-is not
what infuses a judiciary with legitimacy. In other words, the
current literature on judicial selection-which is almost entirely
focused on choosing between judicial election or judicial
appointment-may frame a debate incapable of resolution.
This Article revisits the extant literature on judicial selection
and legitimacy, and proposes an alternative interpretation. This
Article proposes that what the literature consistently describes is
an institution that' needs to derive legitimacy at a different
process juncture-determining who is eligible to be a judge.
Selecting among an extant list of possible judges-and debating
the manner of selection-is a step too late.
The solution proposed by this Article is that any judicial
aspirant be screened by a civil-service-like, objective merit

33. JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTINGJUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING ON
JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY 131 (2012).
34. Craig Deegan, Legitimacy Theory, in METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH: THEORIES, METHODS AND ISSUES 161 (Zahirul Hoque ed. 2006); see also, DAVID
EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 278-80 (1965) (explaining that
institutional legitimacy can lead to individuals' support of authority, even in the face of
specific failures by those institutions).
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system. Political processes would be limited to then selecting a
judge from the list of qualified candidates that emerge. The
idea is to not focus on who precisely Judge Persky is and what
precisely he did (or on any other individual judge or decision),
but to focus on a requirement that any judge must, by
definition, be found appropriately and exceptionally qualified
as determined by an apolitical system. Then, perhaps, a
community might react to a result such as the sentence of Brock
Turner by recognizing that the judge perhaps knew something
that the press did not report, and accepting that decision. That
is legitimacy.
Part I of this Article reviews the extant literature on the role in
a democracy of legitimacy in general, and judicial legitimacy
specifically. Part II addresses the literature on the conflicting goals
ofjudicial accountability andjudicial independence, which paints
a confounding picture of the impact ofjudicial selection methods
in serving either or both goals. Part III offers a reinterpretation of
the judicial selection literature, proposing that it consistently
describes a different solution-a more aggressive merit screening
of judicial aspirants. And Part IV seeks to untie the apparent
Gordian knot of removing politics from judicial selection while
retaining a democratic element in the judicial branch.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY, JUDICIAL SELECTION,
AND LEGITIMACY

A. Democracy
In the book, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Yuval
Harari describes how humans have overcome the limitations of
small clans of individuals by adopting the construct of
"common myths that exist only in [human] imagination.""
Harari argues that these common myths are the basis of almost
all recorded human history, beginning with the agricultural
revolution and threading through the development of religion
and economic systems and government.
True democracy itself is one such "common myth." For much
of human history, the dominant organizing principle in world
governance was "might makes right." As Thomas Hobbes put it,

35.

YuvAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND 27 (2014).
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life is "nasty, brutish, and short."3 6 Sheer power-the threat to
one's continued corporeal existence and the avoidance of pain
and suffering-undoubtedly was an effective method to enforce
adherence to shared myths, such as the infallibility and
supremacy of a monarch.
In his book, The Cave and the Light, Arthur Herman traces the
gradual emergence of the view that rulers do not properly derive
power from force of arms, but from the people, who both may
chose and remove rulers.? The idea began with William Ockham,
was part of the philosophical underpinning of the "Catholic
Schism" (the only instance before recent times when a Pope
voluntarily relinquished office), was famously developed by John
Locke, and was memorialized by Thomas Jefferson in the
Declaration of Independence.?
While the great western philosophers of the Renaissance
disagreed about whether "common myth" advanced or hindered
individual rights, all saw it as the only option in the absence of
governance through force. Thomas Aquinas and his followers
posited that in the natural state, man was totally free and utterly
unsafe. Thinkers such as Hobbes saw government as existing to
regulate brutishness-an agreement to trade some degree of
natural rights for some degree of civil rights. 3 John Locke argued
that liberty was protected, not hindered, by the social contract:
proper government was not a restraint on natural liberty, but an
expansion of it by providing a framework for protecting and
nurturing it. In the view of Locke, therefore, government by
popular consent was "what separates a society of free men from a
society of slaves.""
When Ithe North American British Colonies declared
independence from the Crown-not long after the death of
Locke-modern democracy, a form of government explicitly
based on social contract, was born. The second sentence of the
Declaration of Independence asserted, "Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving theirjust powers from the consent

36. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH, EcCLESIASTICALL AND CIVILL 84 (Alfred R. Waller ed., Cambridge Univ.

Press 1904) (1651).
37. ARTHUR HERMAN, THE CAVE AND THE LIGHT 357-58 (2013).
38. Id. at 252-56, William Ockham famously conceived of the logical construct of
Ockham's Razor-the simplest solution likely is the correct one.
39. Id. at 358-359.
40. Id. at 359-60.
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of the governed. .. . ""The Declaration of Independence rejected
"might makes right," explicitly adopting a principle of shared,
voluntary self-governance.
Democracy is, of course, a myth. It is a collective acceptance
among dispersed strangers-most of whom will never have
occasion to communicate with each other even once-that they
will somehow believe and accept an amorphously-identified
common intention and accord their individual conduct within a
presumed, but never actually negotiated, social contract.

B. judicial Selection andjudicialLegitimacy in Democracies
Early on, the Founders of the United States saw the connection
between, and conundrum of, democracy and how individuals got
to be judges. As Stephen Croley summarizes,
In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton argued that permanence
of tenure, which he considered to be a great virtue of the
proposed federal judiciary, would avoid many ills associated
with subjecting judges to political pressures. According to
Hamilton, an independentjudiciary constituted the "citadel of
the public justice and the public security." His argument is
however
"Periodical
appointments,
uncompromising:
regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or
other, be fatal to [the judiciary's] necessary independence."
Half of a century later, Alexis de Tocqueville joined Hamilton
by suggesting that some states' then-emergent practice of
subjecting judges to periodic elections was tantamount to an
attack on "the democratic republic itself." 4 2
Yet, as quoted above, Jefferson thought that making judges
"dependent on none but themselves" ran counter to the principle
of "government founded on the public will." 43
That debate has yet to wane. For example, in 2015, in WilliamsYulee v. Florida Bar,' Justice Ginsburg wrote, "Unlike politicians,
judges are not 'expected to be responsive to [the] concerns' of
constituents. Instead, 'it is the business ofjudges to be indifferent
45
to popularity.'J
justice Scalia responded that,

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
42. Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: ElectiveJudiciariesand the Rule ofLaw, 62
U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 694-95 (1995) (citations omitted).
41.

43.

12 THE WORKS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 5 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).

44. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
45. Id. at 1674 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (first quoting McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014); then quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
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A free society, accustomed to electing its rulers, does not
much care whether the rulers operate through statute and
executive order, or through judicial distortion of statute,
executive order, and constitution. The prescription that
judges be elected probably springs from the people's
realization that their judges can become their rulers-and (it
must be said) from just a deep-down feeling that members of
the Third Branch will profit from a hearty helping of humble
pie, and from a severe reduction of their great remove from
the (ugh!) People.4 6
Academics and philosophers chew on the same concepts.
Aristotle's Rhetoric describes the three modes of persuasion as logos,
ethos, and pathos.4 7 Logos is an appeal based on logic. 48 Ethos is an
appeal based on the credibility of the speaker.4 9 Pathos is an appeal
based on emotion." Contemporary social scientists, beginning with
David Easton, implicitly describe how a nonviolent society requires
its institutions have all three-logos, ethos, and pathos.
This is a conversation about legitimacy. Easton describes "the
inculcation of a sense of legitimacy" as "probably the single most
effective device for regulating the flow of diffuse support in favor
both of the authorities and of the regime. "51 Easton posits the
question whether a political system could survive without "feelings
of legitimacy," and answers that such convictions are "helpful and
perhaps even necessary."52
If the constant threat of living on a precipice of disorder is to
be avoided, at a minimum the authorities require some
assurance .. . they
can
expect
regularly
to
obtain
compliance.. . . The belief in the legitimacy of the authorities
and regimes provides such a stable connection. Regardless of
what the members may feel about the wisdom of the action of
authorities, obedience may flow from some rudimentary
convictions [that the authorities] ... are legitimate.53

380, 401, n.29 (1991)).
46. Id. at 1681-82 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
47. Christoff Rapp, Aristotle's Rhetoric, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Feb. 1, 2010),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/.
48.
Using Rhetorical Strategies for Persuasion, PURDUE ONLINE WRITING LAB,
https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/general-writing/academic-writing/establishing-arguments

/rhetorical-strategies.html.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51.

EASTON, supra note 34, at 278.

52. Id. at 278-79.
53. Id. at 279-80.
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Easton's work introduced the label of "Legitimacy Theory," or
that which "gives explicit consideration to the expectations of
society ... and [to] whether an organization appears to be
complying with the expectations of the societies within which it
operates."54 Institutions with diffuse, rather than specific,
support are said to be legitimate, meaning the institution enjoys
support even when society disagrees with the institution's
specific acts.5 5

Harari, Easton, Herman, Locke, Scalia, Ginsburg, De
Tocqueville, Hamilton, Jefferson, and scores of others all grasp
the same core concept: legitimacy-including judicial
legitimacy-is essential to democracy. An acceptance of a
government institution-including its courts-acting in a way a
constituent disagrees with is the glue of a healthy, nonviolent,
democratic society.
C. Legitimacy and thejudiciary in Democracies
The U.S. Supreme Court from time to time explicitly
acknowledges the centrality of legitimacy to the judiciary's own
viability and the sometimes ill-fitting relationship between
legitimacy, democracy, and the judiciary. In Taylor v.
56
Louisiana,
the Court wrote that "[c] ommunity participation in
the administration of the criminal law . . . is . . . critical to
public confidence in the criminal justice system."5 In his

dissent in Bush v. Gore,58 justice Stevens famously wrote that the
opinion undermined the "public treasure" of "the public's
confidence in the Court itself" and thus "was a wound that may
harm ... the Nation."5 9 In Press-EnterpriseCo. v. Superior Court,'
the Court wrote,
The open trial thus plays [an] important a role in the
administration of justice. . . . The value of openness lies in the
fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence
54. Deegan, supra note 34, at 201.
55. Id. at 161; EASTON, supra note 34, at 273.
56. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
57. Id. at 530; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (prohibiting racebased peremptory strikes ofjurors will strengthen "public respect for our criminal justice
system"); U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) ("The very integrity of the judicial system
and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the
framework of the rules of evidence.").
58. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
59. Id. at 157-58 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
60. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
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that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure
knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that
established procedures are being followed and that deviations
will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic
fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so
essential to public confidence in the system.61
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,"2
Justice O'Connor wrote,
The root of American governmental power is revealed most
clearly in the instance of the power conferred by the
Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United States and
specifically upon this Court. As Americans of each succeeding
generation are rightly told, the Court cannot buy support for its
decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree, it
cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The
Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the people's
acceptance of theJudiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's
law means and to declare what it demands.6 3
Scholars agree. Leslie Ellis and Shari Siedman Diamond,
summarizing the work of several social scientists, wrote,
[P]eople are more willing to accept decisions and to adhere to
agreements over time when they perceive those decisions as having
been produced by fair procedures. Moreover, the authority and
perceived legitimacy of the institutions that produce the decisions
are enhanced when the procedures used to produce the decisions
are viewed as fair, even when those decisions involved unfavorable
outcomes. The comfort and positive reactions of litigants are of
course important in and of themselves. But building perceptions
of-procedural justice has an additional important payoff:
enhanced authority and legitimacy increase the likelihood that the
parties will accept the jury's finding. The more legitimate the
process is perceived to be, the more likely participants are to
accept the outcome, positive or negative.6 4
Yet social scientists have been slow to comprehensively and
specifically apply Legitimacy Theory to the judicial branch. Much
of the scholarly work applying Legitimacy Theory to the justice

61. Id. at 508.
62. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
63. Id. at 865.
64. Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, andjury Composition: Battering
and BolsteringLegitimacy, 78 CHICAGO-KENT L. REv. 1033, 1040 (2003).
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system focuses the U.S. Supreme Court and concludes that the
Court has a deep reservoir of legitimacy.6" But in 2008, Cann and
Yates found that "[d] espite the policy import of state courts, only
a relatively small number of studies have examined citizen support
for state courts, and nearly all of these have analyzed only a single
city or state's citizens' views toward its courts."66
Within this small number of studies, Gibson's 2012 book, Electing
judges: The Surprising Effects of Campaigning on judicial Legitimacy,
stands out.' 7 Gibson did precise, deep analysis of the 2006 Kentucky

judicial elections.6 He concluded that "it seems that somewhere
around three-fourths of the American people extend legitimacy to
their state judicial institutions." 69
How important is the legitimacy of the judiciary to a democracy?
The recent example of Poland provides a provocative insight. On
July 22, 2017, Poland's Parliament passed "new laws to give it more
control over the country's courts."70 The laws "would force all current
Supreme Court judges to resign, replacing them with jurists chosen
by the governing party's minister of justice."7 1 The public reacted
with "[t]housands of people" protesting in "dozens of cities across
Poland."72 Two days later, the President of Poland decided to veto
the bill, stating the new laws "would not strengthen the sense of
justice in society."7 Amnesty International was more blunt, saying the
veto decision "pulled Poland back from the brink of all-out assault
on the rule of law."74 Yet the same events repeated a year later.75

65.

See Damon Cann & Jeff Yates, Homegrown InstitutionalLegitimacy: Assessing Citizens'

Diffuse Support for Their State Courts, 36 AM. POL. RES. 297, 297-300 (2008) ("A wealth of
scholarship exists on the topic of public support of and views toward the United States
Supreme Court.").
66. Id. at 300 (citations omitted); accord GIBSON, supra note 33, at 7 ("In-depth research
on public attitudes toward courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court is sparse, but far from
non-existent.").
67. GIBSON, supra note 33.

68. Id. at 17-20.
69. Id. at 130.
70.

Rick Lyman, Poles Hope to Sway Presidentfrom Curtailing Court's Independence, N.Y.

TIMES (July 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/world/europe/polandcourts-andrzej-duda-law-and-justice.html.

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Wila Frej, Poland's President Decides to Veto

Controversial Judicial Refom Bills,

HUFFINGTON POSr (July 24, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/polandpresident-veto-judiciary-us_5975ealde4b00e4363e0d09f?zz&ncid=inblnkushpmg00000009.
74. Id.
75.

Marc Santora, Poland Purges Its Supreme Court, and Protesters Take to the Streets, N.Y.

TIMES (July 3, 2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/world/europe/poland-

supreme-court-protest.html.
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Or consider one aspect of the political chaos that was North
Carolina in 2017.76 In October 2017, following the loss of the
executive house, the (majority Republican) North Carolina
legislature sought to enact a court reform plan that had been
dormant for years.77 Despite this being squarely within their
legislative power, the course of action evoked accusations of
political bias due to its timing. Whether or not this was the intent,
this is a prime example of the sensitive balance legislatures must
consider when taking actions that might affect judicial legitimacy.78
In the end, the challenge is not identifying the importance of
judicial legitimacy to democracy, but identifying how to foster and
protect it.79 As Gibson finds, while the U.S. Supreme Court is one
of the most trusted government institutions in the world, even its
legitimacy can erode, and "what we do not know ... is
whether/why/how/under what conditions changes take place.""
Put another way, precisely how-if at all-can one structure a
judiciary simultaneously to be accountable, independent, and
legitimate in a democracy?
Important in this task is keeping straight the difference
between legitimacy and trust. As a general matter, one intuitively
trusts judges who make decisions they agree with and mistrustseven seeks to remove-judges who makes decisions they disagree
with. But if the judiciary has legitimacy, then one trusts a judge
that they disagreewith. This is a critical distinction, and one that
even legitimacy scholars lose track of from time to time.
II. THE CONFOUNDING

LITERATURE ON WHICH IS MORE

IMPORTANT-JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY (ELECTEDJUDGES) OR
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (APPOINTEDJUDGES)-IN A DEMOCRACY

The term "legitimacy" is a recent addition to the conversation
weighing accountability and independence, but the conversation

76.

Trip Gabriel, In North Carolina, Republicans Stung by Court Rulings Aim to Change the

Judges, N.Y. TIaES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/us/northcarolina-republicans-gerrymander-judges-.html.

77. Id.
78.

2017),

Major NCJudicialDistictReshuffling Moves Forward,CAROLINA PUBL. PRESS (Sept. 22,

https://carolinapublicpress.org/27479/major-judicial-district-reshuffHing-moves-

forward/.
79. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., JudicialSupremacy, Departmentalism,and the Rule
of Law in a PopulistAge, 96 TEX. L. REV. 487, 488-93 (2018) (suggesting that the "most

urgent challenge ... is to find ways to rehabilitate the ethical commitments that our
political and judicial institutions need in order to operate successfully").
80. GIBSoN, supranote 33, at 7-8.
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has been going on for quite a long time." There is a lot of

literature-indirectly and increasingly directly-considering the
big question: How can one structure ajudiciary to be accountable,
independent, and legitimate in a democracy?
Any hope that the work has pointed to an answer is misplaced.
The work is a mess. As Professor Lee Epstein summarized in 2013,
For decades now, many law professors, judges, institutes, and
professional associations (including the American Judicature
Society), have been leveling an assault on judicial elections.
Their attack is multi-pronged but usually the words "special
interests," "judicial independence," "impartiality," and
"legitimacy" appear somewhere in their articles and speeches,
and on their websites. Now the assaulters are under assault. The
counter-attackers are mostly social scientists, with a sprinkling of
law professors. Armed with vast amounts of data, their point isn't
to show that judicial elections aren't as bad as we've been led to
believe; it is to demonstrate that forcing judges to face the
electorate has substantial benefits."
For example, Bickel proposes and develops,
When the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative
act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of...
the actual people ... it exercises control, not [o]n behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it. . . . and it is the reason the
83
charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic.

Croley responds that " [e]lective judiciaries are illegitimate and
should be dismantled forthwith."'
Senior Hoover Institute Fellow Barry Weingast argues that a
counter-majoritarian
without
survive
cannot
democracy
85
provisions, and goes so far as to assert that "the U.S. Constitution
is highly undemocratic."8 6 Michael Dimino recognizes that
"judicial independence is a foundational principle-perhaps the
87
foundational principle-of Article III" of the Constitution. But

81. See, e.g., Michael D. Gilbert, Judicial Independence and Social Welfare, 112 MICH. L.
REV. 575, 576-79 (2014) (tracing the history and debate ofjudicial independence).
82. Lee Epstein, Electoral Benefits: The Assault on the Assaulters of Judicial Elections, 96
JUDIcATURE 218, 219 (2013).
83. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT

THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (Yale, 2d ed. 1986).
84. Croley, supra note 42, at 789.
85. Barry R. Weingast, Capitalism, Democracy, and CountermajoritarianInstitutions, 23
SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 255, 267-69 (2015).
86. Id. at 256.
87. Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that Man Behind the Robe:JudicialElections,the
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Dimino argues that "the governmental interests in maintaining an
independent, impartial judiciary and in protecting the
appearance of the judiciary as independent and impartial" cannot
"provide justification for the suppression of speech, where such
suppression would be held impermissible in elections for other
offices."" AndJacintha Webster observes,
The election of judges was not something fundamental to the
structure of our nation. In fact, at the time of the founding,
there were very few, if any, elected judges. Judges were almost
always appointed by the executive or legislature. It was not until
the Jacksonian Era that people began to elect judges. 9
At that time, the idea was to "ensure that state judges would
command more rather than less power and prestige." 90 Barn adds,
A favorite pastime of judicial selection scholars is critiquing
judicial elections. . . . And the academics are not alone... . the
American Bar Association has called on states to end the practice
of electing judges entirely. . .. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has
also been the public face of the campaign against judicial
elections... . But one group overwhelmingly favors judicial
elections, and it is the one group that matters most: the people
themselves. Despite their concerns about biased elected judges,
approximately 80% of the public supports judicial elections.9
Judges chime in too. For example, the Court repeatedly asserts
that public confidence in judicial integrity is a "state interest of the
highest order."92 And the Honorable David F. Hamilton, ajudge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
characterizes the federal judiciary as "admired across the globe for
its combination of independence, competence, and fairness."
First Amendment, andjudges as Politicians,21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301, 306-10 (2003).
88. Id. at 303.
89. Jacintha M. Webster, An Impossible Balance:judicial Elections and the Constitution, 9
ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 384, 387-88 (2016); see also Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State
ConstitutionalReform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 337-

41 (1983) (tracing the history of the elected judiciary among the various states).
90. Hall, supranote 89, at 354.
91.

Dmitry Barn, Restoring the CivilJury in a World Without Trials, 94 NEB. L. REv. 862,

883-84 (2016) (citations omitted); see also Raymond J. McKoski, Living With Judicial
Elections, 39 U. ARK. LirrLE RocKL. REv. 491, 491 (2017) ("Some of the most educated and
respected jurists, journalists, and scholars describe judicial elections in very unflattering
terms such as awful, unconstitutional, idiotic, scary, unwise, demagogic, and doomed.
Those more olfactorily oriented complain thatjudicial elections smell and stink.").
92. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015); Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,
793 (2002) (Kennedy,J, concurring).
93. David F. Hamilton, Federal Courts and Partisan Conflict, 50 IND. L. REV. 127, 129
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But appointing judges is not necessarily a panacea either."
There are dramatic historical examples of the dangers of
unregulated judicial officers.9 5 And, "[a] Ithough [life-tenured
schemes] are designed to induce judicial independence, once the
appointing regime changes, they can produce the opposite
effect."1 6 Indeed, some scholars argue, "[I]f we define judicial
independence as the ability to behave sincerely, that is, in line with
truly-held preferences, then non-renewable terms may be a better
97
mechanism for inducing such behavior than life tenure."
Perhaps "ideally public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge's
role because the judge often is called upon to disregard, or even to
defy, popular sentiment."98 But no judge is totally independent;
independence resides on a continuum. 9 So, as Kang and Shepard
write, "[T]he usual problem with elected judges, as critics ofjudicial
elections would put it, is not that judges are responsive at all to
political incentives, but that they are excessively so."oo
It all can be a confounding theoretical debate.10 1 Empiricists
have not made the answer any clearer. 102

(2016).
94. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 124-33, 51-54, 159-60 (1991) (discussing the issues
surrounding federal judicial appointments in light of the failed Robert Bork nomination
to the Supreme Court).

95. See generallyJoseph W. Bellacosa, Devils and Angels ofjudicialIntegrity, 90 ST.JOHN'S
L. REV. 1, 3-9, 13-15 (2016).
96.

Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study ofJudicialBehavior, 57 WM. & MARY L. REv.

2017, 2054 (2016).
97.

Lee Epstein et al., ComparingJudicialSelection Systems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 7,

35 (2001).
98. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991).
99. Gilbert, supra note 81, at 583.
100. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, JudgingJudicialElections, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 929, 939-40 (2016); accord Gilbert, supra note 81, at 596-97 (arguing that the "thorny"
issue of independence versus accountability can be resolved by more precisely defining an
optimal level of judicial independence); see also Charles Garner Geyh, The Dimension of
judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 497, 513-14 (2013) (seeking to resituate judicial
impartiality as a political and jurisprudential concept).
101. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1571, 1573 (1988) ("The attempt to reconcile judicial independence with democratic
premises has preoccupied several generations of political theorists and academic
lawyers.").
102. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical
Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26J. L. ECON & ORGAN. 290, 328 (2010)
("We began this project with the assumption that the data would demonstrate that
appointed judges are better than elected judges. Our results suggest a more complicated
story. It may be that elected judges are, indeed, superior to appointed judges. Or it may be
that elected judges are superior to appointedjudges in small states only and not necessarily
in large states. At a minimum, the conventional wisdom needs to be reexamined."); see also
Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial
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Kang and Shepard "examined the general relationship between
television campaign advertising and judicial decision-making" and
"found that the more television ads aired during state supreme
court judicial elections in a state, the less likely justices are to vote
in favor of criminal defendants.""'s Lee Epstein found "when
judges in the United States know that they must face the electorate
to keep their jobs, the judges engage in sophisticated behavior,
such as ruling for in-state plaintiffs and against criminal
defendants." 10 4 And as Michael Gilbert describes,
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Iowa unanimously held that
same-sex couples have a right to marry under the state
constitution. A year later, Iowans voted out of office three
justices who joined that opinion. In the months leading up to
the vote, out-of-state groups spent nearly one million dollars on
political ads targeting the justices. 05
Nownes and Glennan write, "Empirical studies confirm that
elected judges do indeed behave differently on the bench, and
that this redounds to the detriment of vulnerable citizens."1 6 Or
maybe not-Cann found the opposite.10 7 And a more nuanced
conclusion was reached by Gibson, who found that in judicial
elections "policy pronouncements by candidates do not
undermine legitimacy, while policy promises do."108

Focusing in particular on legitimacy, Benesh found partisan
judicial elections undermine legitimacy." Kang and Shepard
agreed: "[T]he influence of campaign contributions on judicial
decisions is limited almost exclusively to judges facing partisan
10 Further,
elections."o
not all money is of equal dignity-Nelson
Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 315, 321, 324-27 (2001) (discussing empirical findings from
a study of state supreme court elections and asserting that the data provided some clear
conclusions as well as more nuanced information).
103. Kang & Shepherd, supranote 100, at 930.
104. Epstein, supra note 96, at 2054.
105. Gilbert, supra note 81, at 576-77.
106. AnthonyJ. Nownes & Colin Glennon, An ExperimentalInvestigation of HowJudicial
Elections Affect PublicFaith in the JudicialSystem, 41 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 37, 40 (2016); see also
Bam, supra note 91, at 870-81 (analyzing empirical studies showing bias in elected judges).
107. See Damon M. Cann, CampaignContributionsandjudicialBehavior, 23 AM. REV. POL.

261, 265, 271-72 (2002) (concluding, based on a study of Wisconsin Supreme Court case
decisions and judicial elections, that judicial elections "cannot be dismissed as a poor
method ofjudicial selection on the grounds of campaign finance corruption").
108. James L. Gibson, Campaigningforthe Bench: The CorrosiveEffects of Campaign Speech,
42 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 899, 899 (2008).
109.

Sara C. Benesh, UnderstandingPublic Confidence in American Courts, 68J. POL. 696,

701-02 (2006).
110. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The PartisanPrice ofjustice- An Empirical
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found "dark money" election support undermines judicial
legitimacy less than direct or independent support from
litigants."1 ' And all of this work to some degree begs the questions,
unless appointing judges insulates the judges from the influences
of partisanship. Kang and Shepard found it did not-partisanship
infects appointed judges as well. 2
As part of his "Axiom of 80," Geyh reviewed a collection of
public polling data and concluded, "Eighty percent of the public
believes that financial contributions to judicial election campaigns
buy influence."113 Kang and Shepherd empirically confirmed that
campaign contributions effectjudicial decisions by elected judges
in favor of the contributors."' 4 They further contended that "this
influence extends to a wide range of cases beyond the primary
15
policy interests of the contributors themselves." Yet, Melinda
Gann Hall's work concluded that aggressive election advertising
16
has little effect on judicial behavior.'
The American Bar Association found that isolated issues of
intense political interest are increasingly the focus of judicial
election campaigns.' 1 7 But to what effect? Ansolabehere and
8
lyengar found that negative ads depressed voter turnout." Finkel
1
and Geer disagreed.
Public polling is equally unilluminating:
Eighty percent of surveyed citizens believe that judges in their
state should be elected, and 70 percent report being convinced
Analysis of Campaign ContributionsandjudicialDecisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 107 (2011).
111. Michael J. Nelson, Is There a Silver Lining? Dark Money and Support for the State
Courts, 67 DEPAULL. REV. 187, 188 (2018).
112. See generally Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow ofBush v.
Gore:JudicialPartisanshipin Election Cases, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1414-18 (2016).
113. Charles G. Geyh, WhyJudicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 54-55 (2003).
114. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 110, at 128; see also Kang & Sheppard, supra note
100, at 930 (asserting that television attack ads vilifying perceived judicial leniency toward
criminal defendants are associated with increasedjudicial hostility to criminal defendants).
115. Michael S. Kang &Joanna M. Shepherd, Skewed Justice: Citizens United, Television
Advertising and State Supreme Court justices' Decisions in Criminal Cases, AM. CONST. SOC'Y,
https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/reports/skewed-justice/.
116. MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES: How CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING
INFLUENCES STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 176 (2015).
117. AM. BAR ASSN, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
(July 2003),
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 18-22
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judind/Jeopardy/pdf/rep
ort.authcheckdam.pdf.
118. STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: How POLITICAL
ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE 109 (1995).

119. Stephen Finkel & John Geer, A Spot Check: CastingDoubt on the Demobilizing Effect
of Attack Advertising, 42 AM.J. POL. SC. 573, 577 (1998).
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that "public criticism ofjudges makes judges more accountable
and leads to better decisions." . . . [yet] 81 percent of
respondents agree that "Courts are unique institutions that
should be free of political and public pressure."12 0
Charles Geyh reviewed the available data and found appointing
judges to be essential to public acceptance ofjudges who decided
cases the public disagreed with. 121 Binder and Maltzman found
that the politicization of the confirmation process delegitimized
those judges.'2 2 But Bonneau and Hall, as well as Gibson,
concluded that many of the various intuitively troublesome
aspects of electing judges do not degrade legitimacy.1 2 3
Nownes and Glennon summarized the work of their
predecessors by noting,
While previous studies have unquestionably improved our
understanding of elections and their effects on judicial legitimacy,
we believe that one general question remains under addressed.
That question is this: Does the method by which judges acquire
their positions affect public perceptions of judicial legitimacy?
Though it may seem at first glance that some do, none of the studies
we cite above address this precise question directly.1 24

Nownes and Glennon concluded that while the public does not
trust elected judges, the public trusts appointed judges less: "Does
electing state supreme court justices negatively affect levels of
diffuse support for the state supreme court? Our findings suggest
125
that the answer to this question is 'No."'
In an equally nuanced and complex conclusion, Sara Benesh's
work seems to find the opposite:
What kinds of individuals are most and least likely to support the
courts in their communities, then? Considering the results of the
analysis overall, it seems that a highly educated individual with
experience as a juror and a strong understanding of the court
system, who has a high level of baseline confidence in the
institutions of government, and who lives in a state where judges
120. Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States Are Responding to
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How JudicialElections are Changing 38 AKRON
L. REv. 625, 642 (2005).
121. Geyh, supra note 113, at 78-79.
122. SARAH A. BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN, ADvIcE & DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE TO
SHAPE THE FEDERALJUDICIARY 136-42 (2009).
123. E.g., CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL

ELECTIONS (2009); GIBSON, supranote 33, at 132.
124. Nownes & Glennon, supra note 106, at 40-41 (emphasis omitted).
125. Id. at 56.
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are appointed and the crime rate is low will demonstrate the
highest levels of confidence in state courts. On the other hand, a
person without much formal education, who had been a defendant
at least once in his or her life and does not consider him or herself
to be informed about courts, who does not much trust the
institutions of government and happens to live in a state with
26
electedjudges and a high crime rate will have the lowest levels.'
This all is just a small-albeit representative-fraction of the
literature on legitimacy and judicial selection. In the world of
legitimacy, accountability, and independence, finding reputable work
on both sides of any question is easy. Both theorists and empiricists
127
have studied the issues ad nauseam, and the results are vexing.
III. REINTERPRETING THE DATA ON LEGITIMACY ANDJUDICIAL
SELECTION

A. How to Read the JudicialSelection Literature as ConsistentRather
than Inconsistent
So how can one explain the seemingly oxymoronic literature
on judicial selection methods and legitimacy? One interpretation
is that the work is flawed, since it cannot be consistently replicated
to support the same conclusion. But an alternative explanation is
that the work is exactly correct-what the literature is describing
is that all methods of judicial selection are overly politicized in
ways that undermine legitimacy.
Alljudges-even appointed, life-tenured judges-can be and are
subject to the same sort of implicit biases that one fears might infect
nonprofessional decision-makers. 128 For judges selected by
politicians, unsurprisingly, that implicit bias lines up politically;
thus, for example, U.S. Supreme Court Justices appointed by
Democrats apparently are more liberal than their Republicanappointed counterparts.'2 And that is potentially problematic,
126. Benesh, supranote 109, at 696.
127. See generallyLawrence Baum, Supreme Court Elections: How Much They Have Changed,
Why They Changed, and What Difference It Makes, 42 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 900, 903-04, 91619 (2017) (concluding from four recent studies of state judicial elections that the
implications from these studies are mixed and complex).
128. See generally Holger Spamann & Lars Kl6hn,Justice is Less Blind, and Less Legalistic,
than We Thought: Evidence from an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 256,
259-62, 268-73 (2016).
129. Richard L. Hansen, Polarization and the Judiciary, ANNUAL REv. POLL. SC.
at
file
(on
9-11)
at
(manuscript
2019)
(forthcoming
3 20 8
8) (arguing that Supreme
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=31
Court justices are increasingly partisan and vote fairly consistently with the party ideology
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because all of the judicial selection systems in the United States
"give central roles in the selection process to people in the political
sector (the Chief Executive, legislators, and the general public) as
distinguished from the legal sector (lawyers and judges)."1
It is not inevitably problematic. Political actors-presidents,
governors, legislators, and voters-do not have to politicize their
judicial selection decisions. There used to be little campaigning
in judicial elections.13 1 There used to not be live hearings for
confirmation of federal judges, much less highly politicallycharged hearings.1 2 But whatever dignity, neutrality, civility, and
meritocracy there ever was in judicial selection, it seems long
gone. Sound empirical work finds the politics ofjudicial elections
is worsening,133 as is the politicization ofjudicial appointments.1 4
The players in the legal system all feel what is going on.
Federal judges who have been through the appointment and
confirmation process describe it as already partisan and getting
more so.'3 5 At the ABA's 2017 midyear meeting, ABA President
Linda Klein felt compelled to reaffirm, "It is vital that our

of the nominating president).
130. Baum, supranote 127, at 901. Professor Charles Black suggested (almost 50 years
ago) that it was the obligation of Senators to take political considerations into account in

the discharge of "advise and consent" Charles L. Black,Jr., A Note on SenatorialConsideration
of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657, 658-60 (1970).
131. Joseph Tanfani,judicial Elections GettingMore Politicalwith New CampaignSpending,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-na-judicialelections-20141123-story.html.
132. Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiativesand the Threat

ofElectoralReprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 733, 739 (1994).
133. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 110, at 81 ("[J]udicial elections have become
increasingly politicized, more competitive, and have created new electoral pressures for
judges. By 2000, 75% of nonpartisan elections were contested, up from 44% in 1990.
Similarly, a staggering 95% of partisan elections were contested in 2000, up from 68%
inl990.").
134. See, e.g., Aimee Brown, Judicial Confirmation Through the Lens of Constitutional

Interpretive Theory, 80 ALB. L. REV. 807, 807-08, 813-14 (2017) (discussing the Senate
confirmation process for Supreme Court nominees and suggesting that, despite efforts, it has
not improved or become less contentious); John Comyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation

Process and the Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 182-88 (2003)
(providing examples of Senate filibuster used to blockjudicial nominees who possessed both
bipartisan support and the highest possible ABA rating); Michael Teter, Rethinking Consent:
ProposalsforReformingtheJudicialConfirmationProcess, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 288,290-97 (2012)
(tracing the evolution of confirmation-process flaws, including obstruction and delay of
judicial nominees' confirmations); see also Jennifer Williams-Alvarez, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Wants Parties More United in High Court Confirmation Process, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 6, 2018),

https://www.law.com/newyorklawjoumal/sites/newyorklawjoumal/2018/02/06/ruthbader-ginsburg-wants-parties-more-united-in-high-court-confirmation-process/
(noting
Justice Ginsburg's urging more civility and bipartisanship in the confirmation process).
135. David F. Hamilton, FederalCourtsand PartisanConflict, 50 IND. L. REv. 127, 132-34
(2016).
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judiciary remains independent and free from political
pressure-independent from party politics, independent from
Congress and independent from the President of the United
States himself." 1 6 Obviously, she was concerned the opposite was
emerging. Professor Roy Schotland writes, "Vulnerability is
obvious for judges facing election."' Judge David Hamilton
writes, "We have a nomination and confirmation process that is
threatening

to become dysfunctional."1 3 8

Famously, former

California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus said that ignoring
the potential impact of one's judicial decisions on one's
likelihood of winning a retention election was "like ignoring a
crocodile in your bathtub."'3 9

Politicization undermines legitimacy. Gibson, for example,
finds that the legitimacy of courts is undermined by political ads
that "portray courts as 'just another political institution,"' and in
fact, "research has uncovered some evidence that extremely
politicized campaign ads have negative consequences."'o

There is eroding public confidence in the judiciary, and it all
tracks back to politics.141 And it corresponds to attempts to

censure or remove judges in response to unpopular decisions.1 42

B. Why CurrentJudicialSelection Methods Fail
It may remain true that the judiciary generally enjoys greater
legitimacy than other branches of government.' 4 3 But in a time
when the President of the United States casually says about the
judicial branch, "what we have right now is a joke and it's a

136. ABA President Affirms Judicial Independence, President-elect Nominee Looks Forward,
ABA NEWS (February 6, 2017), http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-

archives/2017/02/abapresident the.html; accord, William T. Robinson,justice In jeopardy:
The ABA Perspective, 46 IND. L. REV. 7, 10 (2013) ("The American Bar Association's
goal ...

is to preserve our Founding Fathers' vision of the judiciary as the third, non-

political branch.").
137. Roy A. Scotland, New Challenges to States'JudicialSelection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1078
(2007).
138. Hamilton, supra note 135, at 132.
139.

Maura Dolan, Otto Kaus Dies;Formerjusticeon State High Court, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 13,
2 421

5_1_state-high-court.
1996), http://articles.latimes.com/1996-01-13/local/me140. GIBsON, supra note 33, at 133-34.
141. Geyh, supra note 113, at 45.
142. Id. at 45-50.
143. See Christine A. Kelleher & Jennifer Wolak, Explaining Public Confidence in the
Branches ofState Government, 60 POL. RES.Q. 707, 713 (2007) (finding that the U.S Supreme
Court enjoys the highest perception of legitimacy out of all federal and state governmental
institutions, while state courts are only subordinate to the state executive branch in the

level of public confidence they enjoy).
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laughing stock," 1" this relative evaluation seems to stand for little.
If objective rather than relativistic judicial legitimacy not only is a
laudable goal but also is a central pillar holding up communal
civility in a democracy, then something needs to be done.
If politics are the problem, then electing judges plainly is not
the solution. But simply biasing toward appointment and
confirmation rather than elections to select and retain judges
apparently is not the answer either.14 5
The federal judicial nomination and confirmation process
does have both a formal and informal merit-selection screening
process. The President and the Senate do formal merit reviews.
The American Bar Association does an informal review. In recent
times, neither seem to count for as much as one would hope.
Consider, for example, the 2017 nomination of Matthew
Petersen to be a United States District Court judge. On
September 7, 2017, President Trump nominated Mr. Petersen to
the federal bench. 1 " He was rated as "qualified" by the American
Bar Association. 47 Mr. Petersen's Senate confirmation hearing
became a "viral" sensation when he struggled to identify basic
litigation terminology.148
Or consider Brett Talley. When nominated, the thirty-sixyear-old Talley had practiced law for three years, had never
tried a case, and was rated "unqualified" by the ABA.149 On
November 12, 2017, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved
his nomination.15 0

144. Rebecca Savransky, Trump: USJusticeSystem A LaughingStock,' oke', HILL (Nov. 1,
2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/358275-trump-us-justice-system-alaughing-stock-joke.
145. See generallyJosh Chafetz, UnprecedentedJudicialConfirmation Battles and the Search

for a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 97-110, 111-18 (2017) (analyzing the history and
politicization of the federal courts' appointment and confirmation process).
146. President DonaldJ Trump Announces Seventh Wave ofJudicial Candidates, WHITE
HouSE, (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidentdonald-j-trump-announces-seventh-wave-judicial-candidates/.
147. Debra Cassens Weiss, Federaljudicial Nominee Who Couldn't Define 'Motion In

Limine"

Withdraws,

ABA

J.

(Dec.

18,

2017),

http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/federal_ judicial nominee who-couldnt_
definemotion in liminewithdrawsackn.

148. Id.
149. Steve Benen, Senate GOP Keeps Endorsing Trump's Unqualified Judicial Nominees,
MSNBC (November 10, 2017), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/senate-gopkeeps-endorsing-trumps-unqualified-judicial-nominees.
150. Id. Talley later withdrew his name from consideration. David Savage, Embattled
Trump Judicial Nominee Brett Talley Withdraws, LA TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-pol-essential-washington-updatesembattled-trump-judge-nominee-withdraws-1513192192-htmlstory.html.
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Or consider that on January 8, 2018, President Trump
resubmitted two nominations for federal judgeships of personsCharles Goodwin and Holly Teeter-that the ABA rated "not
qualified."1 5 1 These are not necessarily quixotic nominations-the
Senate confirmed L. Steven Grasz as ajustice of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, despite the ABA rating
Grasz "not qualified."15 2
Multiple presidents have nominated multiple judicial aspirants
to the federal bench whom the ABA rated "unqualified."' 53 The
point here is not that President Trump is doing so, or that any
other president has done so, but that there is simply no
consistently, generally agreed upon set of judicial qualifications,
even informal, simply by virtue of judges being appointed rather
than elected.
Nor does adding the layer of a prenomination, merit-selection
commission perforce solve the legitimacy conundrum. The
contemporary public face of advocacy for merit selection ofjudges
is retired U.S. Supreme CourtJustice Sandra Day O'Connor. 5 4 In
promotion of an independent, apolitical judiciary, Justice
O'Connor promotes widespread adoption of the "Missouri
Plan"-the essentials of which are the governor appointing a
judge from an aspirant list identified by a nonpartisan
commission, with the judge after a period of time thereafter
standing for retention election.' 5 5 TheJustice explicitly links merit
selection with legitimacy:
The legitimacy of the judicial branch rests entirely on its
promise to be fair and impartial. If the public loses faith in
that-if they believe that judges are just politicians in robesthen there is no reason to prefer their interpretation of the law

151. Jennifer Bendery, Donald Trump Renominates Court Picks Rated 'Not Qualified' To
Serve, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donaldtrump-judicial-nominees-not-

qualified -us_- 5a4fc2cae4bOlela4bl4e5ld?ncid=inblnkushpmg00000009.
152.

KJ McElrath, Another Unqualified, Extremist judge Confirmed, THE RING OF FIRE

NETWORK

(Dec.

18,

2017),

https://trofire.com/2017/12/18/another-unqualified-

extremist-judge-confirmed/.

153. Phillip Bump, How Unusual Are Trump's 'Not Qualified'JudicialNominations?, WASH.
7
POsT (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpostcom/news/politics/wp/201 /11/10/howunusual-are-trumps-not-qualifiedjudicial-nominations/utm tern=.1de25c6150db.
154. See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, Essentials and Expendables of the Missouri Plan, 74
Mo. L. REv. 479, 479 (2009) ("The question of how we choose ourjudges, whom we entrust
to uphold and interpret our laws, speaks to foundational principles of our judiciary and,
indeed, our nation.").

155. Id. at 485-86.
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or Constitution over the opinions of the real politicians
representing the electorate. Judges rely on the other branches
of government to enforce our orders. With the executive
wielding the power of the sword and the legislature the power
of the purse, you could say that courts wield the power of the
quill. The judicial power lies in the force of reason and the
willingness of others to listen to that reason. After all, a quill is
156
nothing more than a feather that, by itself, is harmless.
O'Connor explains that while acceptance of unpopular judicial
decisions was not always the case in the United States, it notably is
today, and it is this legitimacy-the currency of the courts-that
she fears for if politics are not minimized in judicial selection.1 5 1
But some evidence suggests that O'Connor's prenomination
merit-selection commission may be at best an imperfect solution.
While merit-selected judges may be more independent, they are
not perceived as more legitimate.' To the contrary, while a
number of states have a variant of the Missouri Plan, the legitimacy
of the judiciary continues to erode.
Consider Rhode Island. Common Cause of Rhode Island
(CCRI)-the primary lobbyist and architect of Rhode Island's
current merit-selection system, a Missouri Plan-recounts that
roughly twenty-five years ago the Rhode Island judiciary was to at
least some material degree corrupt, and the people knew it.159
CCRI tried to change the way judges were selected in order to fix
the problem, and the Rhode Island Legislature adopted a version
of the proposal. 160
Fifteen years into the experience, Professor Michael Yelnosky
studied Rhode Island's judiciary to see if Rhode Island's move to
a merit selection ofjudges resulted in more meritorious judges.1 6 1
Yelnosky concluded that with the exception of slight increases in
racial diversity and gender diversity, the only measurable way that
merit selection changed who were Rhode Island'sjudges were not
meaningful-matters like a change in the prevalence of graduates
from Providence College, or the number ofjudges who previously

156. Id. at 489.
157. Id. at 486-90.
158. SeeBONNEAU & HALL, supra note 123, at 137-38 (discussing public perceptions of
merit-selected judges).
159. Email from John Marion, Exec. Dir., Common Cause Rhode Island to Kenneth
Klein, Professor of Law, Ca. W. Sch. of Law (October 20, 2017) (on file with author).
160. Id.
161. Michael J. Yelnosky, The Impact of "Merit Selection" on the Characteristicsof Rhode
Islandjudges, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 649, 649-50 (2010).
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were state employees in some other capacity. 162 Yelnosky further
noted that his conclusions were "consistent with most of the
literature on the impact of merit selection."'"6 For example,
Bonneau and Hall found that, in fact, Missouri Plan states do not
produce a more qualified judiciary than that found in states that
have partisan, elected judiciaries." And more to the point, CCRI
reports that in Rhode Island the public still does not think highly
of the Rhode Island judiciary. 65
Merit selection in and of itself is not a generic, consistent
solution to eroding judicial legitimacy--a conclusion in harmony
with the conclusions more broadly of some scholars who are
deeply critical of the effectiveness of the Missouri Plan approach
to judicial selection.' As Michael Dimino writes, "all this effort to
marginalize the public has had little effect on the supposed
dangers of judicial elections, including the partisan pressures,
increased expense, personal invective, and threats to
independence posed by recentjudicial elections."'6 7 Geyh writes,
As to the relationship between merit selection and
partisanship, critics note that governors do not make
apolitical nominations in merit selection states; rather, they
typically pick favored partisans from the pool of candidates
that the selection commission deems qualified. Merit
selection thus does not eliminate the influence of partisanship
and interest-group politics from judicial selection, but merely
moves it from the point at which judges are elected to the
point at which they are appointed. 168

C. A ProposedBetter Merit-Selection Model
The legitimacy literature is in harmony with the Rhode Island
experience, simply opting for appointment and confirmation,
appointment from a menu of merit-screened aspirants, or
appointment followed by retention elections is not the way to
162. Id. at 655-57.
163. Id. at 656.
164. See BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 123, at 135-37 (analyzing the differences
between states with a Missouri Plan and states with judicial elections).
165. Marion, supra note 159.
166. See, e.g., Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System ofjudicial "Merit"Selection,
67 ALB. L. REv. 803,805 (2004) ("Merit selection hopes to limit the pressure on incumbents
to rule in particular ways by ensuring that there will be no candidate opposing the
incumbent, and therefore less chance that the public will be alerted to those instances
where the judge has flouted the popular will.").
167. Id. at 808 (citations omitted).
168. Geyh, supra note 113, at 56.

298

Texas Review of Law & Politics

Vol. 23

depoliticize and thus relegitimize the judiciary. What is failing? The
problem is what Yelnosky and CCRI describe-even a Missouri
commission applies amorphous
Plan-style merit-selection
qualifications criteria, and so the process does not change who
emerges as a possible judge. This apparently is not lost on the
public at large, and so there is no reason to expect the public to
have any more respect for a judge that emerges from a Missouri
Plan system than from any other system.
To state the problem, however, is to understand the potential
solution, which is to have a very different merit-selection systemone that applies concrete, objective, specific, apolitical
qualifications that produce a different set of aspirants-a set that
prima afacie is professional, qualified, and not screened on any
political criteria.
There is no constitutional barrier to such a system. The
Constitution sets forth no requirements to be a judge.169 The
Constitution sets forth requirements to be President.17 0 The
Constitution sets forth requirements to be a Senator.171 The
Founders recognized and robustly debated who was best
positioned-between the President and the Senate-to pick a
judge.' 2 But the Constitution is silent on who might be qualified
to be picked as a judge or what those qualifications could be.17 1
There is no legal impediment to saying that in order to be on a
ballot, or be on a list of potential appointees, an aspiring judge
must emerge from a correctly structured qualification screening.
There are two templates one could look to for such a system.
The first is Europe, and the second is the system of administrative
judges in the United States.
An example of such a system comes from Europe. The
perceived need for neutral, apolitical, independent judges is not
a perception unique to the United States. As Professor Mary
Volcansek writes, across the globe the question "[w]ho are these
judges and how did they attain their powerful positions . .
is
asked, not only in the United States, but also in democracies
around the world."174
169. See Epstein et al., supra note 97, at 16-17 (showing the Framers were silent when
it came to requirements forjudges, as opposed to requirements for elected officials).

170.

U.S. CONST., art. II,

§

171.

U.S. CONST., art. I,

§ 3.

1.

172. Teter, supranote 134, at 288, 309-14.
173.

Epstein et al., supranote 97, at 7-8.

174. Volcansek, supranote 3, at 363.
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Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden all are examples of
judicial selection through a civil-service model."' The hallmarks
of such a system-designed to result in an independent, apolitical
judiciary-are a separate educational program for aspiring judges,
who then enter the judiciary at an entry or internship level based
on results of objective, competitive examinations, and then
advance internally up the ranks of the judiciary."'
That legitimacy concerns are not routinely raised in these
nations is itself notable-typically scholars reflecting on the
strengths and weaknesses of civil-service judiciaries seem to focus
on different concerns.177 But it is not dispositive. The lack of
academic recognition of legitimacy concerns in Europe does not
establish the absence of the concerns. But it is suggestive, and so
in a sense encouraging.
There is a system of courts and "judges" in the United States
that already is civil-service selected-Administrative Law Judges
(ALJs).178 Aspiring federal ALJs,
Must be licensed attorneys with at least seven years' experience
and pass an examination that tests their ability to draft a
decision and analyze relevant legal issues. Military veterans
receive five to ten preference points. Based on their
experiences, examination scores, and veteran statuses, the
highest-scoring candidates are placed on a list. Agencies,
under what is known as the 'Rule of Three,' may then select
from the three highest-ranking candidates.' 7 9

There are important differences that exist between the two
kinds of judges-administrative and traditional. Typical
administrative courts and their judges often differ from typical
traditional courts and their judges in that, among other things,
175. Id. at 372.
176. Id. at 370-76.
177. See, e.g., Kate Malleson, Rethinking the Merit Principle in JudicialSelection, 33 J.
L. & Soc'Y 126, 126-30 (2006) (analyzing the lack of diversity in the makeup of the
English and Welch courts); Volcker G. Heinz, Berlin rechtsanwalt and London
barrister-at-law, Speech at the 1998 Australian Bar Association Conference in

1998),
(July 4,
Appointment of Judges in Germany
London: The
http://www.heinzlegal.com/sites/default/files/AppointOfJudgesInGermany.pdf
(discussing concerns over citizenship requirements for judges and bias against
minority religions because of the requirements).
178. I put "judges" in quotes because, as Professor Moliterno details, ALJs are not
judges in many material respects. James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary's

Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1191, 1196-99 (2006).
179. Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REv. 797, 804-05 (2013).
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administrative courts are organized within specific agencies in
order to promote ALJs with appropriate, specific subject-matter
expertise, but with the cost that due to agency oversight, ALJs lack
independence. 80 As currently constituted, ALJs are not
themselves independent.18' But that is an issue of being subject to
the direction and employment censure of a broader agency,182
which is not a feature of Article III judges. As Professor Kent
Barnett quips, "ALJs are equal to Article III judges, except for the
Article III part." 8 3
Put another way, ALJs are less insulated from politics than Article
III judges.'" ALJs perceive that while there are many positives to
theirjobs, an overarching negative is that ALJs are in a position that
structurally is more politicized than that of a traditional judge.185
Politics are the enemy of legitimacy. So, there is reason to think
that an ALJ-like selection system for traditional judges-in other
words, civil-service selected, politically independent-could be
the best of both worlds. Which is why it is not surprising that there
is at least one writer who argues that a Continental-like judicial
selection approach is necessary to the legitimacy of the judiciary
in the United States.'
As with the European civil-service system, the example of ALJs is
suggestive and encouraging, albeit not necessarily clear. Thomas
Mans describes how the Administrative Procedure Act
implemented merit selection of ALJs intentionally to imbue ALJs

180. Id. at 806-07; Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, AL Independence, and Administrative
Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana'sAdministrativeProcedureAct, 59 LA. L. REV. 431, 441-

45 (1999) (discussing Louisiana's change to a central panel system to increase ALJs'
independence); see generally Arthur Fried & Robert G. Bernoski, Panel Discussion of

Independence and the Federal AL], 18

J.

NAT'L ASS's ADMIN. L. JUDGES 47, 47-50 (1998)

(discussing ALJs' lack of independence within the Social Security Administration).

181.
(1991).
182.
183.

Debra Cassens Moss, Judges Under Fire:AL]Independence at Issue, 77 ABAJ. 56, 56
Id.
Barnett, supranote 179, at 799. This is not of necessity. An administrative judiciary

that looks a great deal like a civil-service judiciary can be found in Louisiana, where for
structural reasons ALJs are merit-selected, independent, and not subject matter experts.

Bybee, supranote 180, at 431-33.
184. Michel Levant, Pointing the Way to AL Independence, 24 JUDGESJ. 37, 40-41, 43
(1985).
185. See Moliterno, supra note 178, at 1211. Even opponents of the "central panel"
structure do not contest either that current structure is too politicized or that central
panels make progress toward resolving that concern. Barnett, supra note 179, at 827-30.
186. See Judith L. Maute, English Reforms to judicial Selection: Comparative Lessons for

American States?, 34 FoRDIAm URBAN L.J. 387, 391-95 (2006) (arguing that the United
States can take as a model for a nationwide appointment process the recent reforms in

England and Wales).
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with legitimacy.' 7 But that intention is a far cry from concluding
that the APA succeeded in this goal. There isn't a lot-frankly,
almost anything-evaluating the actual legitimacy (or illegitimacy)
of ALJs. Perhaps this is because their legitimacy is unquestionable.
Or perhaps it is because, as captive agency judges, it is assumed that
ALJs are illegitimate. One scholar in administrative law asserts that
an ALJs' legitimacy is entirely derivative of whatever legitimacy-or
88
not-that their agency and agency head enjoys. Administrative
Law Judge Ann Marshall Young makes the case that ALJs are
perceived as illegitimate and that the solution, in part, is to try to
recapture legitimacy by mimicking the true judicial independence
of Article III judges.18" But in the end the work simply has not been
done yet-we do not know whether ALJs enjoy (or do not)
legitimacy, and if so then why.
Where this leaves matters is the intriguing, but as yet only
suggestive, possibility that if aspiring traditional judges went
through a civil-service-like screening like ALJs and many
European judges, then that might, but not necessarily, stem the
erosion of judicial legitimacy. But what the empirical work on
judicial selection and legitimacy does establish with some clarity is
that absent doing something different from what now is being
done, traditional judges-whether elected or appointed-are
experiencing increasing politicization and decreasing legitimacy.
To summarize, the goal of merit selection is noble, but the
weakness is a variant of the conundrum, who watches the
watchmen? So long as humans apply subjective factors to decide
who is a potential judge, those factors will be applied in ways that
reflect the subjective preferences and biases (explicit or implicit)
of the decision makers. This is why law school exams are graded
blind; this is why auditions for a chair in a symphony orchestra are
held behind a screen. An alternative way to interpret the
legitimacy literature is to understand it as a call for a judicial
selection mythology-a system of screening aspirants that breeds
confidence that by definition there is a professional, qualified,
apolitical judiciary.'"
187. Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the 'HiddenJudiciary: How the Merit Process Works in
ChoosingAdministrative Law Judges (PartI), 63JUDICATURE 60, 64-65 (1979).
188. Jim Rossi, ALJFinal Orderson Appeal: BalancingIndependence with Accountability, 19:2
J. NAT'L Assoc. ADMIN. L.JUDGES 1, 18-19 (1999).
189. Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation of AdministrativeLaw Judges: Premises, Means, and
Ends, 17:1 J. NAT'L Asso. ADMIN. L.JUDGES 1, 3-9, 12-13,13 n.17 (1997).
190. It does not bear a lengthy discursive in this Article, but a colorful, concrete
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What might this look like concretely? There are occasional
suggestions for improving judicial selection by means other than
choosing binomially between election and appointment. Geyh
argues for the increased "professionalizing" of the judiciary
through increased judicial training, increased judicial continuing
education, and the public review of the credentials of any judicial
aspirant. 1 Teter proposes a nomination and confirmation process
that mimics the process of deciding what military bases to close.192
Schotland argues for lengthier judicial terms, greater voter
education, stricter election regulation, and more aggressive recusal
rules. 193 None of these proposals achieve the structure the literature
suggests is necessary--an apolitical, specific, intentional, objective
merit screening of judicial aspirants that precedes either an
electoral or nomination and confirmation consideration.
The focus should be on two process aspects: qualification and
assessment. As a starting point, it is embarrassing that more
specialized training is necessary to be a barber than to be judge.
Perhaps it is unimaginable that the United States
comprehensively would create (like some nations in Europe) an
entire educational program that currently does not exist-a
separate legal training track for aspiring judges. But that is not
the only viable training requirement. In the Czech Republic, for
example, a law degree is the generic minimum educational
requirement, but one still cannot become a judge unless they
train for a minimum of three years within the court system. 194
Still too much? Then how about a minimum number of years
and experiences before becoming a judge? For example, U.S.
Supreme Court Rule 5 provides in part: "To qualify for admission
to the Bar of this Court, an applicant must have been admitted
to practice in the highest court of a State, Commonwealth,
Territory or Possession, or the District of Columbia for a period

example of how confidence in process can solve skepticism in individual actors is the story
of "The Ceremony" as the method of the private currency, Z-Coin, in addressing perceived
problems in the private currency, Bitcoin. Morgan Peck, The Crazy Security Behind the Birth
of Zcash, the Inside Story, IEEE SPECTRUM (Dec. 2, 2016), https://spectrum.ieee.org/techtalk/computing/networks/the-crazy-security-behind-the-birth-of-zcash; Zooko Wilcox, The
Design of the Ceremony, ZCASH BLOG (Oct. 26, 2016), https://z.cash/blog/the-design-of-theceremony.html.

191. Geyh, supranote 113, at 74-75.
192. Teter, supranote 134, at 303-04.
193. Roy A. Scotland, New Challenges to States'JudicialSelection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1099103 (2007).
194. Zdkon o soudech [Judge Act], Zfkon 6. 6/2002 Sb. (Czech).
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application."1 9 5 How is it possible that the Justices the lawyer

appears before do not have at least the same requirement?
These kinds of qualifications are necessary but insufficient.
Every level of secondary, graduate, and post-graduate education
identifies specific knowledge and skills necessary to succeed in
that field-that's what the SAT, ACT, LSAT, GRE, MCAT, and
other tests seek to measure. Every licensure profession requires
that one pass a test of appropriate skills and knowledge-that's
what the Bar Exam, Medical Boards, Real Estate Exam, CPA Exam,
and others all are. Plainly it is within a community's ability to
identify a specific set of knowledge and skills necessary to be
qualified to be a judge, and to test for it, just as we do for an
accountant, a barber, a masseuse, a truck driver, and a nurse.
Further, for each of these fields where testing is a threshold for
entry, great attention is paid to the test being objective and to the
grading being unbiased. Again, it is not so hard to do.
And there are some unmtuitive upsides of such testing.
"Everyone, including every judge, is a conglomerate enterprise
whose values and judgments derive from a mysterious jumble of
experiences since childhood."1 96 For example, demographic
characteristics of labor arbitrators correlate to arbitration
outcomes.' 9 7 But through correctly structured testing, implicit bias
can be identified, and so at least through the step of recognition
some attempt can be made at amelioration.
Finally, many professions distinguish between its juniors and its
seniors. There is no reason that entry into all levels of the judiciary
be equivalent. What would be so bad about saying that to be a trial
judge one first must be a magistrate or a commissioner; to be an
appellate judge one first must be a trial judge; or to be a Supreme
CourtJustice one first must be an intermediate appellate judge?
At the risk of sounding trite, this is not rocket science. Process
can imbue legitimacy. Perhaps the instinctive trust of doctors
derives in part because-due to process requirements-it is really
hard to be a doctor, and one has to be quite smart and know a lot

195. SUP. CT. R. 5.
196. Alexander M Sanders, Jr., Everything You Always Wanted to Know About judges but
Were Afraid to Ask, 49 S.C. L. REV. 343, 346 (1998).
197. See generally LauraJ. Cooper et al., What's the Relationship Between LaborArbitrators'
Backgrounds and Outcomes of Discipline andDischargeAwards? An EmpiricalAnalysis, 31 ABAJ.
LAB. & EMP. L. 433, 435, 437-41, 443-45 (2016).
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about medicine in order to be one. This same attention to process
can bolster the legitimacy ofjudges.
IV. BUT ... DEMOCRACY?
In thinking about a system of governance, democracy and
legitimacy were not inevitably values at odds with each other. But
arguably they are now.
A threshold question is whether the judicial branch is even
intended to be democratic. Robert Dahl details seven
"undemocratic elements" in the Constitution.1 98 But Dahl sees this
as a matter of ignorance rather than intention.'" Dahl argues that
when the Supreme Court acts as "an unelected legislative body,"
the Court is invading "the proper province of elected officials." 2

Professor Sanford Levinson agrees with Dahl, sympathizing with
those who see life tenure for Supreme Court Justices as
pernicious, and then somewhat more softly asserting that it is "an
idea whose time has passed."2 0 1

Other scholars would be less troubled. Weingast, for example,
argues the Constitution does not treat democracy as its prime
directive, but rather must and does counterbalance majority will

with antidemocratic structures. 202

It is an interesting theoretical debate, but one the Constitution
and the Founders seem to have resolved. Juries are provided three
times in the Constitution-through the protections of juries in
Article III, Section 2 ("The trial of all crimes, except in cases of
impeachment, shall be by jury" 20 s), the Sixth Amendment ("In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury"20 4 ), and the Seventh
Amendment ("In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any court of the United States" 20 5 ).
198. ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 15-20
(2001). The sixth of these is "judicial power," by which Dahl is describingjudicial decisions
that legislate or make policy. Id. at 18-19.
199. Id. at 7-10.
200. Id. at 153-54.
201. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 7, 123-39 (2006).
202. Barry R. Weingast, Capitalism, Democracy, and Counter-majoritarianInstitutions, 23
Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 255, 256, 267-69 (2015).
203. U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl. 3.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
205. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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Why are juries so prevalent in the constitutional text? The
6
Founders saw juries as a form of democratic self-governance."
As jurors, citizens would be part of "making and executing
laws." 207 Through jury service, citizens could change the nature
of their government. 208 One Anti-Federalist wrote, "It is
essential . .. that the common people should have a part and
share of influence, in the judicial branch. . . . Trial by jury in
the judicial department . .. have procured for them . . . their
true proportion of influence." 2 9 Thomas Jefferson wrote,

"Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be
omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say
it is better to leave them out of the Legislative."210
For pragmatic rather than theoretical reasons, Levinson,
while concerned about the antidemocratic nature of lifetenured Supreme Court Justices, is "not concerned about the
life tenure of 'inferior' judges"; Levinson simply does not see
2 11
The
trial courts as places where laws or policies are made.

irony is that the Founders were most concerned that juries
serve as a check on government power. 21 2 Trial courts arguably
were considered the most democratic of institutions in the
United States.213 And of course, over time, trial courts became
yet more democratic, as judges more frequently were chosen
by popular election.
2 14
That is a
Today, however, juries have all but disappeared.
problem. Democracy in the courts evinced both through juries
and through judicial elections. With juries gone, the best
206. Vikram David Amar,Jury Service as PoliticalParticipationAkin to Voting, 80 CORNELL

L. REV. 203, 218 (1995).
207. Letters from the Federal Farmer (XV), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-

FEDERALIST 315, 320 (Herbert V. Storing ed., 1981).
208. Id. at 315.
209.

Letters from the Federal Farmer (IV), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-

FEDERALIST 249-50 (Herbert V. Storing ed., 1981).
210. Letter from ThomasJefferson to Abbe Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS
OF THOMASJEFFERSON 283 (1950).
211. LEVINSON, supra note 201, at 173.

(Aug. 7, 2015),
212. See Ilya Somin, Opinion, RethinkingJury Nullification, WASH. POsT
7
8
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/0 /0 /rethinkingjury-nullification/?utm-term=.bl24e7cldel6 (arguing that the Founders considered jury
nullification a "vital check on government power" and that nullification is "supported by
longstanding Anglo-American legal tradition").
213. Why Jury Trials Are Important to a Democratic Society, NAT'L JUDICIAL COLLEGE,
https://wwwjudges.org/uploads/jury/Why-Jury-Trials-are-Important-to-a-DemocraticSociety.pdf (tracing the historical and constitutional significance assigned to the jury trial
as part of American democracy).
214. See generally SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICANJURY 1-8 (2016).
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expression of democracy in the judicial branch is judicial
elections. Juries are collateral to the legitimacy ofjudges. But of
course, judicial elections are not. So now a democratic judicial
function and a legitimate judiciary are at odds.
And these are not the only core values in play. As detailed by
Shugerman, among many others, judicial elections directly and
increasingly undermine judicial independence. 215 The United
Nations sees electing judges as a threat to human rights.
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights finds, "Persons selected for judicial office shall be
individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or
qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall
safeguard against judicial appointments for improper motives."216
The OCHCR Training Manual adds, "[I]rrespective of the
method of selection of judges, candidates' professional
qualifications and their personal integrity must constitute the sole
criteria for selection."217 In 1995 the Human Rights Committee of
the United Nations reported about the system of electing judges
in many states in the United States, stating that,
The Committee is concerned about the impact . . election of
judges may ... have.. . on the implementation of. . . rights
[]provided under article 14 of the Covenant.

...

It is also

concerned about the fact that in many rural areas justice is
administered by unqualified and untrained persons.... The
Committee recommends .. . elections be reconsidered with a
view to its replacement by a system of appointment on merit by
an independent body.218
The "Covenant" referred to is the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, article 14 of which provides in pertinent part,
"[E]veryone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal." 219

215. JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS 266-73 (2012).

216. Seventh U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders,
Basic Principleson the Independence of the Judiiary, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.121/22/Rev.1, at 61
(1985), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/114498/files/a-conf-121-22-rev-1-e.pdf.
217. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A MANUAL ON HUMAN
RIGHTS FORJUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND LAWYERS 4.5.1, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN COOPERATION WITH THE INT'L BAR ASS'N
(2003),

file:///C:/Users/katie/Downloads/Human RightsTrainingManual.pdf.
218. Human Rights Comm., Nineteenth Annual Rep., ¶¶ 288, 301, U.N. Doc A/50/40
(1995), www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a5O-40.htm.
219. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec.
16, 1966), www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.
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The United States is a democracy, and fundamentally an
appointed judiciary is less democratic than an elected
judiciary.2 0 A life-tenured judge is less democratic than a judge
subject to retention election or reelection or even
reappointment. And certainly, ajudge selected by application of
apolitical, objective criteria-and who then is promoted
internally within the judiciary-is a structure of the judicial
branch that is less democratic even than our current structure
under Article III.
So how can one promote judicial legitimacy while not
ignoring the constitutional intention that the judicial branch be
a democratic institution? One answer-either the simplest or the
most complex, or perhaps both-is the one offered by Suja
Thomas: recognize all of the ways that through procedural
reform the jury has disappeared from the courts and then
resurrect the jury to reclaim its constitutional prerogative."' If
we were to revive the constitutional role ofjuries, the civil service
judicial selection method would be constitutionally viable due to
an existing check on judicial power.
But the attractiveness of that solution may fray upon closer
inspection. Trials are long and expensive-both strong disincentives
to litigants who otherwise need justice-and jury trials are worse. So,
returning to a robust jury system makes seeking justice slower,
pricier, and, as a result, probably less frequent. Under such a system
passion is not enough to obtain justice-it takes vast resources. One
could postulate that it actually undermines the legitimacy of the
judiciary to make the availability of judicially administered justice
seem more distant and elitist
Another possible way through the woods may lie ill the hope that
a civil-service screening ofjudicial aspirants will, in and of itself, help
restore legitimacy. The solution can be illustrated by a case that was
on the 2018 docket of the U.S. Supreme Court-Lucia v. Securities
and Exchange Commission.222 The case was factually mundane-after a
hearing before an administrative law judge, the Securities and
Exchange Commission imposed sanctions against Raymond Lucia

220. Bonneau and Hall provocatively concluded, however, that nonpartisan judicial
elections arguably are more politicized than partisan judicial elections. BONNEAU & HALL,
supranote 123 at 131-32.

221. Thomas, supranote 214, at 147-86.
222. 868 F.3d. 1021, (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert granted, 138 S. Ct. 736 (Jan. 12, 2018) (No.
17-130).
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and his companies for misleading advertising.22 3 The issue in front of
the Court-one which the Circuit Court declined to review en banc
because it was equally divided 22 4-- was whether the Securities and
Exchange Commission's use of administrative law judges as hearing
officers in administrative proceedings violates constitutional
limitations on "Officers of the United States." 225 The Constitution
requires officers of the United States to be nominated by the
President and confirmed through the Senate's "advice and
consent."2 2 6 The purpose of the clause is to hold such officers

"accountable to political force and the will of the people."22
The debate in Lucia was whether an SEC ALJ is an officer of
the United States. All parties to the case agreed that if an SEC
ALJ is an officer, then they must go through the nomination and
advice-and-consent process. 2 2 Because, as Freytag explains, that is

how the democratic power of the people manifests. 2 29 Or, put
another way, all parties agreed that an ALJ hired through the
civil-service merit-selection process and acting as a judicial
officer would unambiguously meet the Constitution's systemic
definition of democracy if the ALJ ultimately is nominated by the
President subject to the Senate's advice and consent.
In oral argument the questions of the Justices referenced the
need of ALJs to be both independent and accountable.2 3 0 The

Court held that ALJs are inferior officers and so could not be
appointed by staff, but rather only by the President, courts of law,
or department heads. 23 1

223. Raymond L. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 280-83 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
224. Raymond L. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
225. U.S. CONST. art. H § 2, cl. 2.
226. Id.
227. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 883-84 (1991).
228. Brief for Respondent, Raymond L. Lucia Cos. v. SEC (2017) (No. 17-30), 2017
WL 5899983, at *11; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Raymond L. Lucia Cos. v. SEC (2017)
(No. 17-30), 2017 WL 3189046, at *10.
229. An entirely different discussion is precisely what form the Constitution describes
through the phrase "advise and consent." Compare David Strauss & Cass Sunstein, The
Senate, the Constitution, and the ConfirmationProcess, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1491-94,1514 (1992)
(asserting that the Senate should have a more independent and less deferential role in the
confirmation process, including serving in an advisory role to the President in advance of
his or her nomination of a candidate), withJohn 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the
Constitution, and the Confirmation Process:A Reply to ProfessorsStrauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L.

REV. 633, 634-38 (1993) (arguing that the Appointments Clause concentrates power over
judicial appointments with the President and mandates that the Senate "should only reject

nominees for weighty and publicly compelling reasons").
230. Transcript of Oral Argument, Raymond L. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, at 1314, 30-31, 51-52 (2018) (No. 17-130).
231. Raymond L. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051, 2053-54 (2018).
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Of course, all federal judges are nominated by the President
and confirmed subject to the Senate's advice and consent. In
other words, the proposal of this Article-a civil-service-like meritselection screening of judicial aspirants who, once hired, then
would promote from within-does not offend the Constitution's
vision of democracy so long as the initial hiring decision from the
list of qualifying aspirants is made by elected public officials. 3 2
V. CONCLUSION

This Article started with the example of Judge Aaron Perskya well-educated jurist who certainly would have emerged from any
merit-selection screening system. The example of Aaron Persky is
both direct and allegorical.
Judge Persky may, by way of direct object lesson, seem to
undermine the thesis that carefully structured judicial meritselection systems can promote judicial legitimacy. But one also
could posit that the experience of Judge Persky actually bolsters
the thesis. A judiciary with legitimacy insulates all judges in the
system. Ajudiciary without legitimacy exposes all judges. The issue
neither is whether the judge actually is qualified nor is whether
the judge made the right decision, but how instinctively
emboldened or reticent the public is to try to remove any judge
who rules in a way the public disagrees with. This points to the
allegorical lesson. Geyh writes,
When it comes to judicial elections staking out strident positions
at the poles is entertaining and comparatively easy. It is not,
however, especially productive when selection systems are
broken but sweeping reform is infeasible. During. such times,
tabling overstated, all-or-nothing arguments in favor of
incremental reform that can make bad situations better is the
preferable approach."'
No matter what one's personal view on Judge Persky, the
outcome is vaguely unsatisfactory. The questions posited about
him at the start of this Article do and will linger unresolved. So
too is the attempt to fashion a clean and wholly satisfactory system
to have an independent, accountable, and legitimate judiciary.
But that does not make the effort fruitless.
232. Academics and other political and legal theorists may (at least some certainly
would) virulently dispute that this is adequate democracy.
233. Charles Garner Geyh, judicial Selection Reconsidered:A Plea for Radical Moderation,
35 HARv.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 623, 642 (2012).
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